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Abstract. This chapter reviews the literature on the economic effects of reciprocal free trade 
agreements (FTAs). It discusses the impact of FTAs on trade volumes, firm and labor market 
outcomes, and on consumer welfare. The broad picture that emerges is one of positive long-run 
effects, accompanied by often substantial short-run adjustment costs. While some concerns with 
appropriate measurement remain, FTAs seem to increase trade flows, profitability and economic 
efficiency. At the same time, however, trade agreements can lead to important wage and employment 
losses, at least in the short run. 
 
1. Introduction 
The two decades since the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 have seen a 
surge in the formation of reciprocal free trade agreements (FTAs). Between 1995 and 2017, the 
number of FTAs notified to the WTO increased from around 50 to over 320.i While earlier 
agreements focused on the elimination of bilateral tariffs, modern FTAs usually include a large 
number of additional provisions focusing on non-tariff barriers and behind-the-border policies such as 
state aid or competition policy, as well as measures only indirectly linked to trade such as human 
rights or consumer protection.ii 
Against this background, a large body of research has tried to assess the effects of FTAs. This chapter 
summarizes this literature, with a focus on economic impacts. Section 2 starts with the effects of 
FTAs on trade volumes, Section 3 looks at effects on firms and labour markets, and Section 4 focuses 
on the impact on consumers and overall economic welfare. Throughout, the focus is on reciprocal 
trade agreements in which all partners grant improved access to their markets. The literature on 
preferential agreements (e.g. the General System of Preferences) and unilateral trade liberalizations 
undertaken by individual countries is only discussed when it is of relevance to understanding the 
effects of reciprocal agreements. I also do not look at the underlying determinants of the existence and 
design of FTAs, their interaction with the WTO-based multilateral trading system, or at their effects 
on non-economic variables such as human rights or environmental and geopolitical outcomes.iii 
2. Effects on Trade 
The most direct impact of trade agreements is on trade flows themselves, and a substantial amount of 
research effort has been devoted towards measuring such effects. The key challenge in this literature 
is to disentangle the effects of FTAs from the myriad of other factors that also influence bilateral trade 
flows. By far the most important tool to address this problem is the so-called gravity equation which 
models trade flows between two countries as a log-linear function of exporter- and importer-specific 
regressors (e.g., the countries’ GDPs) and bilateral variables such as distance. Gravity equations can 
be used to predict the ‘normal’ level of trade between two countries, and by how much FTAs increase 
trade flows over and above that level. In principle, this could be done by including a number of 
variables measuring the different provisions of an FTA into a gravity equation. In practice, however, 
individual FTA components are often hard to quantify and the sheer number of provisions introduces 
severe multicollinearity problems. Hence, the most common solution is to simply include a dummy 
variable for whether two countries are part of the same trade agreement. 
Earlier estimates of the trade impact of FTAs based on the gravity equation framework produced a 
wide range of results and often found no or even negative effects of trade agreements. For example, a 
meta-analysis by the World Bank in 2005 looked at 17 studies and 362 estimates.iv While the average 
estimated effect of the effect of trade agreements on the partner countries’ bilateral trade was positive 
and large (indicating an FTA-induced trade increase of over 100%), the estimates’ standard deviation 
was very high. Consequently, only slightly above 50% of the estimates were statistically significant 
and positive and 12% were negative and significant. Given that the primary purpose of FTAs is to 
enhance bilateral market access, this absence of robustly positive effects raised questions about the 
validity of these studies and led to important methodological advances. Among the problems of earlier 
papers were small and selected samples, omission of important country-specific control variables and 
endogeneity resulting from the selection of country pairs into trade agreements.v 
Following important contributions by James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop, and Scott Baier and 
Jeffrey Bergstrand, most recent papers include exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects to control 
for multilateral price terms and other country-specific omitted variables.vi The issue of selection has 
also received increased attention although it is fair to say that no consensus has been reached as to the 
best way of accounting for the fact that countries do not choose their FTA partners randomly. One 
approach is to find suitable instrumental variables that are correlated with the likelihood of FTA 
formation but do not directly influence trade between the partner countries. However, authors such as 
Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand have argued that it is difficult to find credible exclusion restrictions 
in practice, as determinants of trade agreements are usually also likely to have a direct impact on 
trade. As an alternative they suggest using country-pair fixed effects to control for endogeneity. This 
is justified if selection is based on time-invariant omitted variables such as geographic proximity or 
the general potential for FTA-induced trade increases. However, if countries systematically sign trade 
agreements with countries with which they have seen strong increases in bilateral trade (or where they 
expect such increases in the near future), only controlling for country-pair fixed effects will 
overestimate the true effect of FTAs. 
Another important innovation that has influenced the literature on the trade effects of FTAs is the use 
of gravity estimation methods other than ordinary least squares (OLS). In an influential paper, J.M.C. 
Santos Silva and Silvana Tenreyro pointed out that OLS estimation of log-linear gravity equations is 
likely to result in biased estimates.vii Because trade flows are non-negative, the gravity equation’s 
stochastic error term will in general be heteroskedastic and log-linearization will introduce correlation 
between the regressors and the error term. Santos Silva and Tenreyro propose using Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation (PPML) to overcome this issue.  
While newer contributions to the FTA literature have only adapted these methodological innovations 
to varying degrees, the broad consensus is that more recent estimates are more reliable and more 
consistently positive. For example, a widely-cited study by Baier and Bergstrand uses a panel of 
around 100 countries for the period 1960 to 2000 and estimates gravity equations controlling for 
country-year and bilateral fixed effects.viii Their findings indicate that FTAs approximately double a 
country pair’s trade after 10 years.ix A recent meta-analysis by Keith Head and Thierry Mayer uses 
estimates from 159 papers published between 2006 and 2012 in highly-ranked journals and also finds 
a positive mean effect of FTAs on trade flows of around 80%, and a median effect of 60%.x 
Importantly, while the mean effect reported by Head and Mayer is slightly lower than that of the 
earlier World Bank meta study (80% as opposed to 120%), the standard deviation of the estimates 
also declined substantially (from 1.3 to 0.5), reinforcing the view that more recent estimates are more 
reliable. 
While the recent literature thus finds strongly positive effect of FTAs on trade, one important caveat is 
that these estimates capture both trade creation and trade diversion effects. This is because they are 
based on a comparison of trade with FTA partners and trade with other countries. So a positive 
coefficient can indicate the displacement of domestic production by imports from the FTA partner 
(trade creation) or the diversion of trade with other countries to FTA partners (trade diversion). Earlier 
studies often included a dummy variable taking the value of one if a country had a trade agreement 
with any other country. When included in addition to the usual bilateral FTA dummy, this variable 
captured changes in trade volumes with non-partner countries. However, the inclusion of country-year 
fixed effects precludes this approach because the additional dummy is not separately identified from 
these fixed effects. Instead, newer studies often rely on general equilibrium models of the global 
economy to capture trade diversion.xi First, a gravity equation is used to estimate the direct effect of 
FTAs on bilateral trade. This estimate is then converted into an ad-valorem equivalent using an 
appropriate trade elasticity. Finally, the model is solved with and without the FTA-induced change in 
trade cost between countries, and the resulting counterfactual trade flow changes in each country pair 
are computed. Of course, different modeling frameworks will lead to different estimates but the 
findings from multi-country Armington-type models suggest that trade diversion effects are 
unimportant relative to trade creation effects.xii 
Embedding gravity estimates in explicitly specified economic models also allows predicting the 
general equilibrium effects of trade agreements that work through changes in domestic income levels 
and prices. Because FTAs improve market access and increase competition, prices in the partner 
countries fall, partially offsetting the direct trade-creating effect of lower barriers. Recent research by 
Keith Head and Thierry Mayer suggest that this offsetting effect can be quantitatively important 
although the exact magnitudes do of course again depend on the model used.xiii 
The vast majority of studies on the trade effects of FTAs focus on merchandise trade and exclude 
trade in services. This is despite the fact that the share of commercial services in total world trade has 
been steadily increasing over the past 30 years and now stands at 22%, or US$4.97 trillion.xiv At the 
same time, a growing share of FTAs include legally enforceable provisions on the liberalization of 
service trade. Whereas only around 30% of FTAs before the creation of the WTO contain such 
provisions, 55% of agreements signed after 1995 do.xv One problem facing research in this area is that 
services trade is inherently more difficult to measure than goods trade. High-quality data is still 
mostly restricted to OECD countries and so is the scope of most of the existing studies. For example, 
Fukunari Kimura and Hyun-Hoon Lee estimate traditional gravity equations based on trade of 10 
OECD countries with 47 OECD and non-OECD partner countries. They find that FTAs increase 
bilateral trade by around 30% for both goods and services.xvi Peter H. Egger, Mario Larch and Kevin 
E. Staub use a sample of 16 European OECD countries and find a direct effect of liberalization on 
goods trade of about 49% and on services trade of close to 220%.xvii While they use modern 
estimation techniques (PPML with country-year fixed effects), their identification mainly comes from 
EU accessions, making the external validity of their results to non-European contexts less clear. This 
view is confirmed in recent work by Monique Ebell.xviii She uses cross-sectional data for 42 rich and 
emerging economies in 2014 and finds that membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) is 
associated with 182% more trade compared to trade between countries without any trade agreement. 
However, no statistically significant effects are found for other FTAs covering services. 
Overall, the recent literature thus finds strong, if sometimes uneven, impacts of trade agreements on 
trade in both goods and services. This raises the question of what the associated impacts on other 
economic variables are. In the next section, I describe impacts on firms and labour markets, and turn 
to consumers and overall welfare in Section 4. 
3. Effects on Firms and Labor Markets 
There is a large and growing body of literature on the effects of trade policy on firms as well as on the 
associated labor market effects. Here, I focus more narrowly on trade policy changes induced by 
FTAs, although I also review evidence from unilateral trade liberalizations where necessary. I do not 
discuss the related and even more voluminous body of research on the effects of trade on growth and 
income levels that relies on aggregate cross-country data. This work has been plagued by 
measurement and endogeneity problems and more recent work has tended to focus on individual 
liberalization episodes and worked with finer firm- or household-level data.xix 
The firm performance measure that has attracted most attention in the literature is productivity, 
measured as either labor or total factor productivity and usually computed on a revenue basis. A first 
mechanism through which FTAs can increase industry-level productivity is by reallocating market 
shares from less to more productive firms. This can happen because reductions in the FTA partner’s 
trade barriers increase sales by domestic exporters which tend to be larger and more productive, or 
because increased competition from foreign producers leads to the exit of less productive domestic 
firms.xx The best available evidence for these FTA-induced reallocation processes comes from the 
1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). For example, work by Jen Baggs shows that 
Canadian tariff reductions sharply increased exit rates, and Alla Lileeva has demonstrated that this 
increase was concentrated among non-exporting firms.xxi Daniel Trefler estimates that CUSFTA 
raised Canadian manufacturing productivity by 5.8% over an eight-year period, and that market share 
reallocations accounted for most of this increase.xxii These findings are consistent with a number of 
papers which have demonstrated similar effect in the context of unilateral trade liberalization. For 
example, Nina Pavcnik has studied firm level adjustment in the wake of the Chilean trade 
liberalization and found that two-thirds of the observed 19 percent increase in productivity was due to 
a market share reallocation towards more efficient producers.xxiii Work by Ana Fernandes also finds 
that market share reallocation is an important driver of productivity growth in Colombia between 
1977 and 1991, a period that saw significant variation in external trade barriers.xxiv 
FTAs can also enhance the productivity of existing firms through a number of channels. First, better 
exporting opportunities raise the size of the market available to a firm and hence increase returns to 
innovation. Consistent with this idea, Daniel Trefler and Alla Lileeva show that CUSFTA led to 
within-plant productivity increases that went hand-in-hand with productivity-enhancing investments, 
and were concentrated among Canadian plants that started exporting to the U.S. in response to the 
agreement.xxv Similarly, Paulo Bustos finds that Argentinian manufacturing firms and industries with 
larger tariff reductions in the wake of MERCOSUR increased investment in technology faster.xxvi 
Second, trade liberalization can also improve access to foreign intermediate inputs.xxvii Third, 
increased import competition can force plants to reorganize production processes and product ranges. 
For example, John Baldwin and Wulong Gu show that CUSFTA led Canadian manufacturers to 
increase production run length, and Andrew Bernard, Stephen Redding and Peter Schott find that U.S. 
firms increasingly focused on core products after the agreement.xxviii 
While the existing literature thus provides ample evidence for the productivity-enhancing effects of 
FTAs, one important caveat is that most studies are unable to distinguish between revenue and 
physical productivity. This is because productivity is usually computed as the residual in a firm-level 
regression of revenues on factor input expenditures.xxix So if trade liberalization leads to changes in 
input or output prices, this will lead to changes in measured productivity even if technical efficiency 
has not changed. Initial research focused on output prices and showed that trade liberalization in 
Turkey and Côte d’Ivoire led to decreases in markups as domestic firms were exposed to tougher 
competition.xxx However, in more recent work Jan De Loecker et al. caution that this effect does not 
easily generalize to other trade reforms.xxxi They show that markups actually increased as a 
consequence of the Indian trade liberalization of 1991, because cost reductions due to cheaper 
imported intermediate inputs were not fully passed on to output prices. While they also find that the 
liberalization had procompetitive effects, these were dominated by the markup increase due to 
incomplete cost pass-through. As noted by Jan de Loecker and Pinelopi Goldberg, the fact that 
markups can both increase or decrease after trade liberalization makes the interpretation of earlier 
studies difficult.xxxii 
The existing literature has also studied the impact of trade agreements on a number of additional firm-
level variables besides productivity. I have already briefly summarized evidence that FTAs can lead to 
changes in firms’ innovation incentives, production processes and product ranges. Another, more 
basic variable that has attracted attention is firm-level profits. Studying profit responses seems 
worthwhile because they are an important part of the overall welfare impact of lower trade barriers 
and also help to understand political economy aspects of FTAs, such as lobbying responses by firms. 
One way of approaching this topic is to look at accounting profits. For example, Jen Baggs and James 
Brander have regressed measures of accounting profitability on tariff changes after CUSFTA and 
found that lower Canadian import tariffs reduced the profits of Canadian firms whereas lower U.S. 
tariffs increased them.xxxiii One potential criticism of this approach is that accounting profits might 
only be weekly linked to profitability in an economic sense.xxxiv Hence, an alternative approach in the 
literature is to use stock market reactions to unexpected FTA-related announcements. Christoph 
Moser and Andrew Rose study price reactions to over 200 FTA announcements and find positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns in the two-and-half weeks after the announcement on 
average, consistent with the view that FTAs increase overall firm profits.xxxv Holger Breinlich looks at 
unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA’s implementation and finds that prices of firms in 
sectors with larger future Canadian tariff cuts experienced negative abnormal returns when CUSFTA 
became more likely.xxxvi By contrast, stronger future cuts in intermediate input tariffs led were 
associated with higher abnormal returns. Future U.S. tariff cuts only benefited the stock prices of 
larger firms, possibly because these firms are more likely to be exporters. Making a number of 
assumptions about market efficiency and the underlying model of stock price determination, Breinlich 
also estimates the implied change in firm profits. He finds that CUSFTA increased total yearly profits 
of Canadian manufacturing firms by approximately 1.2%. 
The final set of outcomes that the literature on trade liberalization has studied are labor market 
variables such as wages and employment, both at the level of sectors and individual firms. The 
literature in this area is extensive and still growing, but surprisingly few studies look at the effects of 
bilateral trade agreements on labor market outcomes. Instead, most evidence comes either from 
unilateral trade liberalizations in developing countries or the effect of import competition more 
generally.xxxvii An exception is Daniel Trefler’s work on CUSFTA where he finds that the tariff 
changes mandated by that agreement reduced manufacturing employment in Canada by 5%. Most of 
the job losses were concentrated in the one-third of industries with the largest Canadian import tariff 
reductions. By contrast, U.S. tariff reductions did not lead to statistically significant employment 
changes in Canada. While lower U.S. tariffs increased employment at exporting plants, they were also 
associated with job losses at purely domestic plants, with the net effect being close to zero. One 
important question arising from these findings is to what extent the overall estimated job losses 
represented short-run adjustment costs or had more long-run negative consequences. Noting that 
employment levels in Canada remained constant over CUSFTA’s implementation period and that 
manufacturing employment even increased slightly, Trefler concludes that employment reductions 
must have been of a short-run nature, with displaced workers being re-employed quickly. At the same 
time, his findings suggest that CUSFTA had positive, if small, effects on earnings and did not lead to 
increases in inequality. 
Studying the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Shushanik Hakobyan and John 
McLaren reach much less optimistic conclusions.xxxviii Their findings show that U.S. sectors producing 
tradable goods that were exposed to steeper U.S. import tariff reductions saw lower wage growth, 
with less-educated workers being particularly negatively affected. They also find that U.S. locations 
that specialized in the tradable goods sectors most affected by tariff reductions experienced lower 
wage growth more generally. One explanation for this is that displaced manufacturing workers do not 
move to other, less affected locations, but compete with workers in non-tradable sectors, hence 
depressing wages. Again, these location-specific effects seem to be particularly severe for less-
educated workers and inexistent for college graduates.  
One concern with these results is that they do not take into account improved exporting opportunities 
to Mexico.xxxix By contrast, Brian McCaig focuses exclusively on the effects of better access to the 
U.S. market following the 2001 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement. He shows that provinces 
with greater shares of workers in industries that experienced larger U.S. tariff cuts saw significantly 
faster reductions in poverty rates.xl 
The evidence base directly relevant for the effects of bilateral trade agreements is clearly still 
somewhat limited. However, many of the findings outlined above echo the conclusions of the much 
larger literature on unilateral trade liberalizations and the effects of import competition. For example, 
Petia Topalova studies the effects of the 1991 Indian trade liberalization and finds that rural districts 
with production sectors more exposed to import tariff reductions experienced slower declines in 
poverty and lower consumption growth.xli In the context of Brazil's trade liberalization in the 1990s, 
Brian Kovak shows that regions facing larger liberalization-induced price declines experienced larger 
decreases in wages.xlii David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson look at the impact of Chinese 
import competition on local labor market outcomes in the U.S. and find that changes in Chinese 
imports are correlated with higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced 
wages.xliii By contrast, studies relying on cross-industry variation of trade policy reach more mixed 
conclusions regarding the wage effects of trade liberalization, mirroring the diverging findings of 
Trefler and Hakobyan and McLaren discussed above.xliv Research into the firm-level effects of 
liberalization also confirms Trefler’s result that exporters and non-exporters react very differently to 
improved exporting opportunities, with the former increasing wages relative to the latter.xlv Potential 
explanations include positive productivity effects of exporting, possibly linked to technology 
upgrading or rent-sharing between exporters and their employees.xlvi 
4. Effects on Economic Welfare 
Arguably the most important impact of FTAs is their effect on economic welfare. Put differently, the 
reason why we care about the effects of FTAs on variables such as trade and productivity is because 
of the associated changes in welfare, usually measured as the percentage change in real consumption 
of a representative consumer.xlvii Leaving aside for now the question for whether this measure is 
indeed a good guide for evaluating the effects of FTAs, the key challenge is to find ways to link 
changes in trade barriers to changes in welfare. 
In an important recent contribution, Costas Arkolakis, Arnaud Costinot and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare 
have demonstrated that for a range of modern trade models, the welfare effects of a change in trade 
costs can be evaluated using just two pieces of information – the change in the share of expenditure 
on domestic goods caused by the change in trade cost and the elasticity of imports relative to domestic 
demand with respect to trade costs (henceforth, the trade elasticity).xlviii Arkolakis et al. focus on 
models featuring a single sector, one production factor, no tradable intermediate inputs and CES 
utility but their results have been generalized across all these dimensions.xlix While the exact formula 
for computing welfare changes needs to be adapted accordingly, the basic idea that the consequences 
of trade cost changes (including changes in import tariffs) can be evaluated using simple macro-level 
sufficient statistics continues to apply. 
Given the simplicity of the Arkolakis et al. approach it is surprising that there does not seem to be any 
work applying their insights to the evaluation of trade agreements. One would need credible estimates 
of the trade elasticity as well as the FTA-induced changes in domestic goods’ expenditure shares; but 
given the progress of the literature on the trade effects of FTAs discussed in Section 2, the latter 
would seem clearly feasible, and trade-policy changes themselves could serve as sources of variation 
to identify the trade elasticity.l 
Of course, the question remains to what extent the numbers predicted by combining modern ‘middle-
sized’ trade models with the Arkolakis et al. formula are credible. These models all predict gravity-
type functional forms for trade flows, ensuring that they tightly fit cross-sectional trade data; but the 
evaluation with respect to the prediction of out-of-sample trade flows and additional relevant variables 
such as factor prices or technical efficiency remains in its infancy.li It should be noted, however, that 
similar concerns plague older large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that have 
been the workhorse for applied trade policy analysis for the past decades. If anything, a small number 
of recent evaluations have shown that the more recent, middle-sized models that are the focus of 
Arkolakis et al. tend to perform better in terms of out-of-sample predictions.lii  
An alternative to estimates based on fully-specified models is to remain agnostic about the supply side 
of an economy and focus on the welfare effects that can be computed based on assumptions about 
consumer demand only. The classic paper in this literature is by Christian Broda and David Weinstein 
who try to quantify the gains to U.S. consumers from increases in the number of imported varieties.liii 
They find that if such gains were taken into account in the computation of the U.S. import price index, 
measured import prices would have been 28% lower over the period 1972 to 2001. Importantly, these 
results only require the specification of a demand system (nested CES in this case) and estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution across foreign varieties.liv 
Again, demand-side approaches such as that of Broda and Weinstein have rarely been applied to 
actual trade liberalization episodes. An exception is recent work by Giuseppe Berlingieri, Holger 
Breinlich and Swati Dhingra who try to measure the consumer price effects of the trade agreements 
negotiated by the European Union between 1993 and 2013.lv They first decompose the overall change 
in import prices into price changes, quality changes and changes in the number of imported varieties. 
They then estimate the impact of FTAs on each of these components by comparing imports of trade 
agreement partners with a control group of other countries. Aggregating across products and time, 
they find that the cumulative effect of the EU’s trade agreements was to lower consumer prices by -
0.13% which translates into savings for EU consumers of around €13 billion per year from 2013 
onwards. Similar to Broda and Weinstein, these results only require the specification of a demand 
system, as well as the usual assumptions underlying the empirical difference-in-differences estimation 
strategy. One downside of this approach is, however, that they have to abstract from a number of 
additional gains from trade, such as reduced mark-ups of domestic firms or cheaper and better 
intermediate inputs.lvi 
Overall, recent approaches towards measuring the welfare gains from trade certainly seem promising 
although applications to actual trade policy changes are still rare. This raises the question whether 
future research efforts should be directed more squarely at estimating the welfare effects of trade 
agreements, and away from more traditional topics such as the impact on trade, productivity and labor 
market outcomes. After all, isn’t welfare what policy makers should care about? Here, there are 
reasons to remain sceptical. One is of course that we might not have sufficient confidence in the 
predictions of what are still relatively stylized models. By contrast, reduced-form estimates of the 
effects of trade agreements on variables such as employment or productivity are generally considered 
to be more reliable.lvii But there are also reasons to doubt whether aggregate consumer welfare is 
really the best measure of the effects of trade agreements. For example, the assumption of a 
representative consumer assumes away many of the real world distributional issues that have been so 
relevant to the recent public debates about the benefits of globalization.lviii On a more fundamental 
level, a well-known criticism of consumer welfare is that it equates well-being simply with greater 
consumption opportunities.lix It stands to reason that citizens and their elected representatives care 
about other economic variables as well, including employment opportunities and life chances more 
generally. Hence, it seems that aggregate welfare effects in the sense of this section will remain only 
one, albeit an important, indicator of the economic success of trade agreements. 
5. Conclusions 
The literature on the economic effects of trade agreements has made important progress over the past 
two decades. The key finding is that FTAs have a substantial impact on numerous facets of economic 
activity, ranging from trade flows to productivity and employment. The broad picture that emerges is 
one of long-run gain for short-run pain. While some concerns with appropriate measurement remain, 
FTAs seem to increase profitability and economic efficiency. At the same time, however, trade 
agreements can lead to sometimes substantial wage and employment losses, at least in the short run. 
Empirically, there also seems to be an important difference between tougher import competition 
triggered by domestic tariff reductions and better access to foreign markets and intermediate inputs. 
Further disentangling these different channels of impact, in particular in the context of labor market 
outcomes, remains an important area of future work. Another area that clearly requires more research 
effort is the quantification of the numerous provisions of modern FTAs that go far beyond tariff 
reductions. Most of the existing work discussed here focuses on the latter but it is unclear whether 
measures such as regulatory harmonization, mutual recognition of qualifications or investment 
liberalization have similar effects. Harmonization of standards, in particular, might interfere with 
domestic regulation aimed at the reduction of market failures and could have less clear-cut welfare 
consequences than the elimination of tariffs. Given that the proliferation of modern bilateral and 
unilateral agreements continues for now, these issues will occupy researchers and policy makers for 
many years to come. 
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